

# **VERSION RELEASE HISTORY**


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1.0	28 July 2023	Version 1 Published	James Campbell-Everden
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
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# 1. Introduction

# 1.1 Purpose and Scope

### See Rule [103(1)(d)]

- 1.1.1 This Interim Cyber Security Procedure (Procedure) is made in accordance with Rule 103(1)(d) and Sub-appendix 4.14 of the Pilbara Networks Rules (Rules).
- 1.1.2 The purpose of this Procedure is to set out the matters necessary to support the ISO's and Rules Participants' functions and activities in respect of Cyber Security Requirements under the Rules.
- 1.1.3 Other provisions of the Rules that support and apply to the making of this Procedure are those in Subchapter 3.6 {Procedures} and Chapter 11 {Information}.
- 1.1.4 The *Electricity Industry Act 2004* (WA), the Electricity Industry (Pilbara Networks) Regulations 2021, the Pilbara Networks Access Code and Rules prevail over this Procedure to the extent of any inconsistency.

## 1.2 Definitions and Interpretation

- 1.2.1 Terms defined in the *Electricity Industry Act 2004* (WA), the Electricity Industry (Pilbara Networks) Regulations 2021, the Pilbara Networks Access Code and the Rules have the same meaning in this Procedure unless the context requires otherwise. The ISO does not capitalise or italicise terms defined in the above instruments in this Procedure.
- 1.2.2 Where there is a discrepancy between the Rules and information on a term in this Procedure, the Rules take precedence.
- 1.2.3 The following principles of interpretation apply in this Procedure unless the context requires otherwise.
  - (a) Subchapter 1.2 of the Rules apply to this Procedure.
  - (b) References to time are references to Australian Western Standard Time.
  - (c) A reference to the Rules or Procedures made under the Rules, have the meaning given to them in the Rules.
  - (d) Words expressed in the singular include the plural and vice versa.
  - (e) A reference to a paragraph refers to a paragraph in the Procedure.
  - (f) A reference to a rule, subchapter or chapter refers to the relevant section in the Rules.
  - (g) References to the Rules in this Procedure in bold and square brackets, e.g. "See Rule [XXX]", are included for convenience only, and do not form part of this Procedure.
  - (h) Any explanatory notes are included for context and explanation and do not form part of this Procedure.
  - (i) The Procedure prevails to the extent of any inconsistency with the explanatory notes contained within it.
- 1.2.4 Appendix A of this Procedure outlines the head of power Rules that this Procedure is made under, as well as other obligations in the Rules covered by the Procedure.

1.2.5 The acronyms. definitions and meanings in Table 1 are used throughout this Procedure.

Table 1: Acronyms, definitions and meanings

Acronym	Term	Definition
AESCSF	Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework	Means the cyber security framework titled "2020-21 AESCSF Framework Core" published by AEMO for the Australian energy sector developed through collaboration by:
		(i) the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO);
		(ii) Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (DISER);
		(iii) Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC); and
		(iv) The Department of Home Affairs (DHA),
		as referred to in the SOCI Act (s30ANA(2)) and Rules made under the SOCI Act
	Critical Electricity Asset	has the meaning given in the SOCI Act, including any applicable Rules made under that Act.
		{Note: as at 1 July 2023, s10 of the SOCI Act stated:
		(1) An asset is a Critical Electricity Asset if it is:
		(a) network, system, or interconnector, for the transmission or distribution of electricity to ultimately service at least 100,000 customers or any other number of customers prescribed by the Rules; or
		(b) an electricity generation station that is critical to ensuring the security and reliability of electricity networks or electricity systems in a State or Territory, in accordance with subsection (2).
		Note: The Rules may prescribe that a specified Critical Electricity Asset is not a critical infrastructure asset (see section 9)
		(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the Rules may prescribe requirements for an electricity generation station to be critical to ensuring the security and reliability of electricity networks or electricity systems in a particular State or Territory.}
	Cyber Security Incident	has the meaning given in the SOCI Act
		{Note: as at 1 July 2023, s12M of the SOCI Act states:
		A Cyber Security Incident is one or more acts, events or circumstances involving any of the following:
		(a) unauthorised access to:
		(i) computer data; or
		(ii) a computer program;

Acronym	Term	Definition	
		(b)	unauthorised modification of:
			(i) computer data; or
			(ii) a computer program;
		(c)	unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer;
		(d)	(d) unauthorised impairment of the availability, reliability, security or operation of:
			(i) a computer; or
			(ii) computer data; or
			(iii) a computer program.}
	Cyber Security Requirements	Means the requ	irements set out in section 3 of this Procedure.
	NWIS Cyber Security Entity	Procedure that	on identified under section 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 or 3.5 of this is responsible for complying with the Cyber Security respect of a network or facility.
	Platform	Means any computer system used by the ISO, the ISO Control Desk or their contractors.	
	Responsible Entity	means the person responsible for a Critical Electricity Asset in accordance with section 10 of the SOCI Act	
		{Note: as at 1 July 2023, section 12L(10) of the SOCI Act states:	
		"(10) T	he Responsible Entity for a Critical Electricity Asset is:
		(a)	the entity that holds the licence, approval or authorisation (however described) to operate the asset to provide the service to be delivered by the asset; or
		(b)	if another entity is prescribed by the Rules in relation to the asset—that other entity." }
	Relevant Impact	infrastructure a a critical infrast	ant Impact of a Cyber Security Incident on a critical sset as described in the SOCI Act, read as if references to ructure asset were references to the network, facility, ISO other equipment in respect of which a person is the curity Entity.
		{Note: as at 1.	July 2023, s8G(2) of the SOCI Act states:
			e following is a Relevant Impact of a Cyber Security ritical infrastructure asset:
		(a)	the impact (whether direct or indirect) of the incident on the availability of the asset;

Acronym	Term	Definition		
-		(b)	the impact (whether direct or indirect) of the incident on the integrity of the asset;	t
		(c)	the impact (whether direct or indirect) of the incident on the reliability of the asset;	t
		(d)	the impact (whether direct or indirect) of the incident on the confidentiality of:	t
			(i) information about the asset; or	
			(ii) if information is stored in the asset—the information; or	
			(iii) if the asset is computer data—the computer data." }	
	Risk Management Program	means a critical the SOCI Act.	infrastructure Risk Management Program as defined in	า
		{Note: as at 1.	July 2023, s30AH(1) of the SOCI Act states:	
		"(1) A <b>critical infrastructure risk management program</b> is a written program:		
		(a)	that applies to a particular entity that is the Responsi Entity for one or more critical infrastructure assets; a	
		(b)	the purpose of which is to do the following for each of those assets:	of
			(i) identify each hazard where there is a material risk that the occurrence of the hazard could have a Relevant Impact on the asset;	nl
			(ii) so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so- minimise or eliminate any material risk of suc hazard occurring;	
			(iii) so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so- mitigate the Relevant Impact of such a hazar on the asset; and	
		(c)	that complies with such requirements (if any) as are specified in the Rules."}	
SOCI Act		Means the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Cth)		
	System Data		electronic information received, generated or stored by orming its functions under the Rules	/

Acronym	Term	Definition
	Target State Maturity Security Profile	Means a measure of target state maturity in accordance with the AESCSF of SP-1, SP-2 or SP-3.
		{Note: the AESCSF Framework Overview published by AEMO contains a description of security profiles, their relationship with maturity indicator levels, target state maturity and other related information.]}

# 1.3 References

- 1.3.1 The following Procedures are linked and must be consulted in conjunction with this Procedure:
  - (a) Interim Visibility List Procedure;
  - (b) Interim Access and Connection Procedure

# 2. Cyber Security Measures

### 2.1 ISO and ISO Control Desk

### See Rule [101(1)(c)]

- 2.1.1 ISO and ISO Control Desk must take reasonable steps to protect their Platforms and ISO's System Data from unauthorised access, theft, and damage, including by ensuring that:
  - (a) only authorised people have access to their Platforms and any System Data;
  - (b) appropriate security controls are established and maintained that prevent unauthorised access to their Platforms and any System Data, including but not limited to, any or all of the following:
    - password protection and other methods to secure access (for example, multi-factor authentication);
    - ii. where appropriate, ensuring unauthorised persons are prevented from accessing any areas containing Platforms or any System Data for example, through ensuring office spaces are locked and require keys to access; and
  - (c) access to Platforms and any System Data is removed for any person who no longer need to access it (because, for example, they are no longer staff members).
- 2.1.2 ISO and ISO Control Desk must take reasonable steps to protect their Platforms and ISO's System Data from viruses, destruction or corruption, including by ensuring that:
  - (a) the operating systems and software installed on their Platforms are regularly updated;
  - (b) industry standard anti-virus software is installed on their Platforms;
  - (c) industry standard gateway firewalls are installed on their Platforms; and
  - (d) staff with access to their Platforms and any System Data receive appropriate training on cyber-security security related matters.
- 2.1.3 ISO and ISO Control Desk (where applicable) must ensure that processes are implemented to a GEIP standard for the off-site back-up of any System Data and other data used or held by ISO, which processes must include requirements that:
  - (a) that back-ups be held both on-site and off-site (e.g. by using cloud services, or other external physical storage);
  - (b) back-ups occur automatically;
  - (c) back-ups are made regularly (or, if appropriate, in real-time);
  - (d) if appropriate, offline back-ups be kept; and
  - (e) back-ups are regularly checked to ensure they are functioning correctly.

- 2.1.4 ISO and ISO Control Desk must ensure that all System Data is safely, securely and completely destroyed once it is no longer reasonably required for the purpose for which it was received, generated, or stored, except where it must be retained in accordance with law or a Procedure made under the Rules, or where it otherwise would ordinarily be retained in accordance with GEIP.
- 2.1.5 Where ISO and ISO Control Desk engage contractors that will possess or otherwise have access to System Data, ISO and ISO Control Desk must ensure that, where appropriate, those contractors:
  - (a) have adequate systems in place to protect any Platforms containing System Data from unauthorised access, theft, damage, viruses, destruction, and corruption, which may include processes and systems similar to those set out in paragraphs 2.1.1 —2.1.3 of this Procedure;
  - (b) only have access to the System Data necessary in order to perform the work for which they have been contracted;
  - (c) no longer have access to System Data once they no longer need to have access to it (for example, when their work is completed); and
  - (d) have binding obligations of confidence under the terms of the relevant contract or retainer in favour of ISO or ISO Control Desk (as applicable) in relation to the use, disclosure, maintenance and confidentiality of System Data.

## 2.2 All Rules Participants

### See Rule [103(1)(d)]

- 2.2.1 All Rules Participants must ensure that they have processes and systems in place that, to a GEIP standard, protect all electronic information they receive, generate or store in performing their functions under the Rules, as well as any computer system used by them to store or process such information, from:
  - (a) unauthorised access, damage and theft; and
  - (b) viruses, corruption and destruction,

### including by:

- (c) taking and storing on-site and off-site back-up copies of such information; and
- (d) where appropriate, having in place processes and systems similar to those set out in paragraphs 2.1.1 2.1.3 of this Procedure.

# 2.3 Confidentiality and Cyber Security for Visibility Data

### See Rule [73; 101(1)]

2.3.1 Rule 101(1)(a)-(b) (Confidentiality and cyber-security for visibility data) requires that a Procedure set out appropriate measures to ensure the confidentiality and cyber security of visibility data.

- 2.3.2 Rule 73(1) of the Rules allows ISO to divide or combine or create new Procedures; and to distribute matters between Procedures as it sees fit, provided it follows the Procedure change process in Appendix 2 {Rule and Procedure change} of the Rules.
- 2.3.3 Measures relating to the confidentiality and cyber security for visibility data are set out in the Visibility List Procedure, which can be found on the ISO website <a href="www.pilbaraisoco.com.au">www.pilbaraisoco.com.au</a>.

# 3. Security of Critical Infrastructure

## 3.1 AESCSF Adoption Encouraged

- 3.1.1 Any controller or NSP that does not need to comply with the requirements of the remainder of section 3 of this Procedure is encouraged to make use of the AESCSF by, for example:
  - (a) undertaking an assessment in accordance with the AESCSF of any of its network or facilities that are connected to the NWIS;
  - (b) develop a Risk Management Program in relation to any Relevant Impact of a hazard that may occur in relation to the network or facility; and
  - (c) develop a program or roadmap to increase, over time, its Target State Maturity Security Profile level in relation to the asset.

### 3.2 Covered Networks and ISO Control Desk

#### See Rule [45]

- 3.2.1 While delegated the ISO real-time control desk functions under Rule 45, the Regional Power Corporation (Horizon Power) is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity for the ISO Control Desk.
- 3.2.2 If a covered network is a Critical Electricity Asset, the Responsible Entity for that asset is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity for the covered network.
- 3.2.3 If a covered network is not a Critical Electricity Asset, the registered NSP of the covered network is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity for the covered network.
- 3.2.4 A NWIS Cyber Security Entity for a covered network or the ISO Control Desk must:
  - (a) achieve and maintain a Target State Maturity Security Profile of not less than SP-1 (Security Profile 1) in respect of that covered network by 18 August 2024; and
  - (b) comply with the requirements of sections 3.8 and 3.9 of this Procedure.

# 3.3 Registered NSPs

### See Rule [Subchapter 4.1]

- 3.3.1 This section 3.3 of this Procedure applies to any non-covered NWIS network that is not an excluded network or an integrated mining network in respect of which a person is the registered NSP in accordance with Subchapter 4.1 {Registration} of the Rules.
- 3.3.2 If a non-covered network to which this section 3.3 applies is a Critical Electricity Asset, the Responsible Entity for that Critical Electricity Asset is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity for the non-covered network.
- 3.3.3 If a non-covered network to which this section 3.3 applies is not a Critical Electricity Asset, registered NSP of the non-covered network is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the non-covered network.

- 3.3.4 A NWIS Cyber Security Entity for a non-covered network to which this section 3.3 applies must:
  - (a) achieve and maintain a Target State Maturity Security Profile of not less than SP-1 (Security Profile 1) in respect of that non-covered network by 18 August 2024; and
  - (b) comply with the requirements of sections 3.8 and 3.9 of this Procedure.

# 3.4 Essential Systems Service Providers

### See Rule [203; 214]

- 3.4.1 If a facility used to provide an essential system service is a Critical Electricity Asset, the Responsible Entity for the asset is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the facility.
- 3.4.2 If a facility used to provide an essential system service is not a Critical Electricity Asset, the controller of the facility is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the facility.
- 3.4.3 A NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of a facility used to provide an essential system service, must:
  - (a) achieve and maintain a Target State Maturity Security Profile of not less than SP-1
     (Security Profile 1) or its reasonable equivalent in respect of that facility by no later
     than 18 August 2024; and
  - (b) comply with the requirements of sections 3.8 and 3.9 of this Procedure.

## 3.5 Integrated Mining Network

### See Rule [5]

- 3.5.1 If a facility located in an integrated mining network is a Critical Electricity Asset, the Responsible Entity for that asset is NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the facility.
- 3.5.2 If a facility located in an integrated mining network is not a Critical Electricity Asset, the controller of the facility is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the facility.
- 3.5.3 A person who is NWIS Cyber Security Entity in accordance with paragraph 0 or paragraph 3.5.2 of this Procedure must:
  - (a) achieve and maintain a Target State Maturity Security Profile of not less than SP-1 (Security Profile 1) or its reasonable equivalent in respect by no later than 18 August 2024; and
  - (b) comply with sections 3.8 and 3.9 of this Procedure.

# 3.6 Connection Point Compliance Facility

### See Rule [Subchapter 9.3]

3.6.1 If a CPC facility is a Critical Electricity Asset, the Responsible Entity for that asset is NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the facility.

- 3.6.2 If a CPC facility is not a Critical Electricity Asset, during the access and connection process, the ISO in consultation with the Host NSP and the CPC facility will determine whether the CPC facility could have a material impact on the NWIS should a cyber security incident occur, and if so, the NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the CPC facility.
- 3.6.3 A person who is NWIS Cyber Security Entity in accordance with paragraph 0 or paragraph 3.5.2 of this Procedure must:
  - (a) achieve and maintain a Target State Maturity Security Profile of not less than SP-1
    (Security Profile 1) or its reasonable equivalent at a time agreed during the access and connection process; and
  - (b) comply with sections 3.8 and 3.9 of this Procedure.

## 3.7 Concurrent Obligations

### See Rule [292(1)]

- 3.7.1 A person may be a NWIS Cyber Security Entity in accordance with more than one of sections 3.2 to 3.5 of this Procedure.
- 3.7.2 A person who is a NWIS Cyber Security Entity under more than one of sections 3.2 to 3.5 of this Procedure:
  - (a) is to comply with this Procedure once in relation to any particular network or facility;and
  - (b) the person may combine any information or report to be prepared or provided in accordance with sections 3.8 and 3.9 of this Procedure more generally into a single instrument or report: see Rule 292(1).

# 3.8 Reporting Obligations

- 3.8.1 Subject to section 3.8.2, a NWIS Cyber Security Entity must, as soon as practicable after the commencement of this Procedure, advise the ISO:
  - (a) whether it is a Responsible Entity for critical electricity infrastructure under the SOCI Act that is located in the NWIS;
  - (b) if it has identified a Target State Maturity Security Profile under the AESCSF is in respect of the network, facility or other equipment for which it is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity and, if so, what that Target State Maturity Security Profile level is; and
  - (c) if it has not identified a Target State Maturity Security Profile level under the AESCSF in respect of the network, equipment or facility for which it is the NWIS Cyber Security Entity, when it expects to do so.
- 3.8.2 For the purposes of paragraphs 3.8.1(b) and (c) of this Procedure, a NWIS Cyber Security Entity for an integrated mining network or facility forming part of an integrated mining system is to advise the ISO if it has a maturity level reasonably equivalent to a Target State Maturity Security Profile under the AESCSF, if so, what that reasonably equivalent maturity level is and, if not, if and when it expects to do so.

- 3.8.3 A NWIS Cyber Security Entity that is a Responsible Entity for critical electricity infrastructure of the kind described in paragraph 3.2 to 3.5 of this Procedure must advise the ISO if it is required to comply with Part 2A {Critical infrastructure Risk Management Programs} of the SOCI Act and corresponding Rules made under that Act.
- 3.8.4 Cyber security risks and Maturity Security Profiles can change. The ISO requires annual reporting to ensure that NWIS Cyber Security Entities are continuously reviewing their risks and Maturity Security Profiles, and that this Cyber Security Procedure remains fit for purpose for the cyber security risks that the NWIS is exposed to.
- 3.8.5 By no later than 30 June each year, a NWIS Cyber Security Entity must provide the ISO in writing by email the following information:
  - (a) the current Target State Maturity Security Profile level achieved by the NWIS Cyber Security Entity in respect of the relevant network and or facility (as the case may be);
  - (b) whether the NWIS Cyber Security Entity has maintained the Target State Maturity Level Security Profile in respect of the relevant network or facility (as the case may be) identified in the previous report provided to the ISO under paragraphs 3.8.1, 3.8.2(a) or this paragraph 3.8.4(b) of this Procedure as applicable; and
  - (c) Whether the NWIS Cyber Security Entity intends to increase its Target State Maturity Security Profile level in the following 12 to 24 months.
- 3.8.6 The information collected as part of this reporting will be treated as confidential information, subject to Subchapter 11.2 of the Rules.

## 3.9 Cyber Security Incidents

- 3.9.1 A NWIS Cyber Security Entity who becomes aware that a Cyber Security Incident is occurring and is having a Relevant Impact on, as the case may be, the network, facility or the ISO Control Desk, must:
  - (a) so far as practicable, within 12 hours of becoming aware of the occurrence of the incident, notify the ISO and the ISO Control Desk whether, in the reasonable opinion of the NWIS Cyber Security Entity:
    - (i) the Cyber Security Incident may or is likely to have material adverse implications for the reliability and/or safety of the NWIS; and
    - (ii) a system coordination meeting should be convened to consider the Cyber Security Incident and determine what measures, if any, are to be taken in response;
  - (b) so far as practicable, within 7 days, provide the ISO in writing by email with information about the incident that includes a general description of its nature and character, the extent of its impact and, if known, its anticipated duration;
  - (c) while the Cyber Security Incident persists, keep the ISO informed and updated in respect of the matters referred to in paragraphs 3.9.1(a) and 3.9.1(b) of this Procedure(b); and
  - (d) notify the ISO and the ISO Control Desk when the Cyber Security Incident has ceased.

# **Appendix A. Relevant Rules**

Table 2 details the Rules under which this Procedure has been developed and where an obligation, process or requirement has been documented in this Procedure.

### **Table 2: Relevant Rules**

Pilbara Networks Rules
5
45
Subchapter 3.6
Subchapter 4.1
103(1)(d)
Subchapter 9.3
Subchapter 11.1
292
Sub-appendix 4.14